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UNDUE INFLUENCE IN THE CONTEXT OF MEDICAL TREATMENT 
 
SHAUN D. PATTINSON 
 
(2002) 5(4) Medical Law International 305–317 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
It is argued that the application of the doctrine of undue influence to patient’s 
decisions in the context of medical treatment is ripe for development. The doctrine is 
capable of providing much needed protection for vulnerable patients if developed 
along lines suggested by its use in other contexts. Unfortunately, the Court of Appeal 
has recently missed an opportunity to develop the law in this way and it may be some 
time before another suitable opportunity is presented to the courts. 
 
 
 The doctrine of undue influence has a long pedigree as a means of aiding 
vulnerable persons whose will has been overborne by another. The law of equity aids 
victims of improper pressure by relieving them of the consequences of their decisions. 
As we shall see, in certain circumstances equity has also been willing to draw 
rebuttable evidential inferences of undue influence, as a matter of policy. Just about 
all the relevant case law, however, has been transaction based, and the full potential of 
the doctrine in the context of medical treatment is only just starting to be realised. It 
will be argued that the law of undue influence needs to be developed further if it is to 
give adequate protection to the rights of vulnerable patients. In particular, it will be 
argued that equity’s willingness to invoke evidential inferences of undue influence in 
specific transaction-based circumstances should apply in specifiable medical contexts. 
 There are at present only two cases on undue influence in the context of medical 
treatment, both of which reached the Court of Appeal. The first, Re T,1 was a case 
concerned with pressure put on a weakened patient by a close relative, leading her to 
refuse a blood transfusion. The second is the focus of this article, U v Centre for 
Reproductive Medicine,2 which concerns the withdrawal of consent to posthumous 
storage and use of sperm when pressured to do so by a medical advisor. Taking these 
cases in reverse order, this paper will briefly summarise their key features before 
outlining the law of undue influence as it has developed in other areas. It will then be 
argued that there are powerful moral grounds for extending the law as it as developed 
in transaction contexts so that it offers protection proportionate to the vulnerability 
and interests of patients in the context of medical treatment. 
 
 
U AND RE T 
 
In U, the Centre for Reproductive Medicine, which is part of Bristol University, 
sought declarations from the court concerning storage and use of sperm removed 
during the treatment of a patient before his unexpected death. The wife of the 
deceased wished to have the opportunity to use this sperm in an attempt to bear a 
child. The clinic sought the court’s permission to destroy the sperm or, in the 
alternative, to transfer it to another licensed clinic for storage and use. As we shall 
see, the case turned on whether the withdrawal of consent to posthumous use by the 
now deceased had been voluntary. 
 The couple, Mr and Mrs U, had approached the clinic after an unsuccessful 
operation to reverse Mr U’s vasectomy. The day before Mr U underwent a successful 
operation to remove his sperm, he completed a form provided by the clinic on which 
he had ticked boxes indicating that he consented to storage and use of his sperm after 
his death. According to Mrs U’s evidence, accepted as accurate by the court, after 
signing the form he had said to his wife, “There you go. If I die you can have my baby 
still.”3 
 The extracted sperm was stored and just over a month later the couple attended a 
meeting with a specialist nursing sister at the clinic. At this meeting Mr U was asked 
to alter the form, as the “ethical policy” of the clinic (strongly supported by the 
nursing sister) was against posthumous treatment. This meeting took place two days 
before Mrs U was due to receive treatment, some four and a half months after the 
couple’s first consultation at the clinic. In evidence, Mrs U claimed that it was 
“strongly implied” that continuation of treatment was conditional upon Mr U 
changing his form.4 The nursing sister gave evidence that the treatment would merely 
have been postponed until after counselling. Nonetheless, Butler-Sloss P at first 
instance thought that “the pressure must have been considerable”,5 and the Court of 
Appeal noted that the couple “had already committed themselves, mentally, 
emotionally, and financially, to the course of treatment” and “were both very 
vulnerable.”6 
 Unfortunately, the treatment following the meeting was unsuccessful and Mr U 
died unexpectedly shortly after. The clinic then made an application to the court, 
which was heard a year after Mr U’s death. 
 The President of the Family Division held that the pressure placed on Mr U did 
not amount to undue influence, as something more than pressure was required; the 
patient’s will must have been overborne. It followed that the withdrawal of consent 
was to stand. Hale LJ, giving the judgment of the Court of Appeal, upheld the 
President’s decision that the sperm was to be destroyed. As we shall see, however, it 
is not entirely clear whether the Court of Appeal supported the full details of the 
President’s analysis of undue influence. 
 The only case law cited to the President, and the principal case explored by the 
Court of Appeal, was Re T. Like U, Re T was concerned with pressure put on a patient 
to withdraw consent in the context of medical treatment. In Re T, however, the 
pressure was not from the medical team treating her. T was a pregnant woman who 
had been injured in a car accident and refused a blood transfusion after a meeting with 
her Jehovah’s Witness mother. The patient was in a weakening condition and had 
previously stated that she was not a Jehovah’s Witness. After undergoing a caesarean 
section the patient became unconscious and in need of a blood transfusion. Her father 
and boyfriend applied to the court to authorise such a blood transfusion. The Court of 
Appeal set aside the pregnant woman’s prior refusal on the basis that she had been 
temporarily incompetent and her will had been overborne by her mother. 
 It is this second ground that concerns us here. On this Lord Donaldson of 
Lymington had stated that, 
 
The real question in each such case is “Does the patient really mean what he says or is he 
merely saying it for a quiet life, to satisfy someone else or because the advice and 
persuasion to which he has been subjected is such that he can no longer think and decide 
for himself?”7 
 He went on to state that when considering the effects of outside influences two 
aspects were of crucial importance: the strength of will of the patient and the 
relationship of the “persuader” to the patient. Butler-Sloss P was keen to apply this 
test in U. She also cited dicta from Staughton LJ’s judgment, but as noted by the 
Court of Appeal, she did not cite her own judgment where she had stated that “in 
equity it has long been recognised that an influence may be subtle, insidious, 
pervasive and where religious beliefs are involved especially powerful”.8 
 
 
THE DOCTRINE UNDUE INFLUENCE 
 
 Before examining the application of Re T in U by the High Court and the Court of 
Appeal, it is useful to outline the doctrine of undue influence as it has developed 
outside the context of medical treatment. 
 There is a large body of case law on transactions induced by improper pressure. 
The most recent line of which has been concerned with improper pressure being 
applied by a husband to persuade his wife to stand her interest in the matrimonial 
home as security for his indebtedness (hereafter the “surety wife cases”). The surety 
wife cases are, however, somewhat removed from the present situation as the victim is 
not usually seeking a remedy against the wrongdoer—indeed, the wrongdoing 
husband is often supporting his wife in her attempt to prevent the lender relying on its 
security. Consequently, in these cases the courts have often focused more on the 
doctrine of constructive notice,9 than on undue influence. Nonetheless, the two 
leading surety wife cases—Barclays v O’Brien10 and Royal Bank of Scotland v 
Etridge11—do provide enlightening analysis of the doctrine of undue influence. 
 Building on a distinction first drawn in the nineteen century,12 Lord Browne-
Wilkinson in O’Brien distinguished cases where undue influence has to be 
affirmatively proved (class 1 or actual undue influence) from cases where the 
relationship between the parties will lead the courts to presume undue influence (class 
2 or presumed undue influence). Following an earlier decision of the Court of 
Appeal,13 he further divided class 2 cases into two categories. The first, class 2A, was 
said to encompass certain relationships that “as a matter of law raise the presumption 
of undue influence has been exercised”.14 The second, class 2B, was said to 
encompass those situations where the complainant “proves the de facto existence of a 
relationship under which the complainant generally reposed trust and confidence in 
the wrongdoer.”15 
 In Etridge, their lordships emphasised that the class 2 presumption was no more 
than an “evidential rebuttable presumption,” shifting the onus from the party alleging 
undue influence to the party who is denying it.16 The weight of this presumption (or 
inference) and the evidence needed to rebut it will depend on the nature of the 
relationship and the nature of the transaction.17 Thus, if a transaction is challenged 
where the relationship between the parties is one of trust and confidence (either 
presumed or proven)18 and the nature of the transaction calls for an explanation, the 
party denying undue influence will bear the burden of proving that the transaction was 
not the result of improper pressure.  
 As stated above, the only decision considered by the High Court and the only 
decision considered in any depth by the Court of Appeal in U was Re T. Perhaps, this 
was because the surety wife cases and other cases on undue influence were only 
concerned with transactions, rather than medical treatment. Indeed, in Re T Butler-
Sloss LJ denied the relevance of the “probate line of cases” and “the donor line of 
cases”19 and agreed with Staughton LJ who held, 
 
The cases on undue influence in the law of property and contract are not, in my opinion, 
applicable to the different context of consent to medical or surgical treatment. The wife 
who guarantees her husband's debts, or the widower who leaves all his property to his 
housekeeper, are not in the same situation as a patient faced with the need for medical 
treatment.
20
 
 
There are, indeed, differences between a decision on a transaction and a decision on 
medical treatment. In Re T, for example, the decision was of a different order of 
importance—it was one of a life-and-death. The potentially greater importance of 
decisions on medical treatment, however, offers no reason for rejecting the distinction 
(albeit only an evidential distinction) between actual and presumed undue influence. 
Nonetheless, both Re T and U are, in effect, treated as cases of alleged actual undue 
influence; i.e., class 1 undue influence. In U counsel seems to have conceded that 
medical law cases (or at least this one) could not give rise to a presumption of undue 
influence. According to Hale LJ, 
 
Mr Treverton-Jones QC, on behalf of Mrs U, accepts that the burden of proving undue 
influence lies upon her. This is not a situation in which undue influence is to be 
presumed.
21
 
 
It will be argued that this concession was unnecessary, as there are good policy 
reasons why the situation in U ought to be one where the law is willing to invoke a 
presumption of undue influence as least as strong as that invoked in class 2A 
situations. 
 
PRESUMED UNDUE INFLUENCE AND DIRECTIVE COUNSELLING 
 
As stated above, both Re T and U were treated as cases falling into class 1 (actual) 
undue influence in which the parties wishing to set aside the effects of his/her 
decision bears the onus of proving improper pressure. In U, the decision at first 
instance suggests that Mrs U came very close to discharging the onus of proof, as 
Butler-Sloss P thought that the “evidence was finely balanced”. Nonetheless, she went 
on to state that 
 
it is difficult to say that an able, intelligent, educated man of 47, with a responsible job 
and in good health, could have his will overborne so that the act of altering the form and 
initialling the alterations was done in circumstances in which Mr U no longer thought and 
decided for himself….[Mr U] succumbed to the firmly expressed request of…[the nursing 
sister] and under some pressure. But to prove undue influence, Mrs U has to show 
something more than pressure. As Lord Donaldson said in re T, it does not matter how 
strong the persuasion was so long as it did not overbear the independence of the patient's 
decision.
22
 
 
Thus, according to Butler-Sloss P, “an able, intelligent, educated man of 47, with a 
responsible job and in good health” would not be expected to succumb to 
“considerable”23 pressure put on him by a medical advisor. With all due respect, a 
patient with no medical training seeking medical treatment is in an inherently 
vulnerable position. Although the factors cited by the President suggest an ability to 
think independently, these attributes are likely to be weakened by the degree of trust 
typically vested in medical opinion and the emotional vulnerability of most patients. 
In U itself, the key person, Mr U, was obviously unable to present evidence. 
Moreover, at the time when the pressure was applied he had no reason to think that 
the clinic would be in a position where his views on posthumous storage and use 
would have any practical consequence—he had no reason to anticipate an early death. 
If in a position where one is asked to change an official statement of one’s views 
where the costs of not doing so appear to be high (Mr U believed that treatment would 
stop) and the consequences of doing so appear to be negligible (an early death seemed 
no more than a remote possibility and he might well have intended to reassert his 
views with regard to any surplus sperm following successful treatment),
24
 even a 
small amount of pressure will be sufficient to overbear one’s will. An intelligent and 
educated person in such a situation might well agree with the nursing sister for (to use 
the words of Lord Donaldson cited above) “a quiet life” without really meaning “what 
he says”. To put it another way, given Mr U’s apparent desperation to have a child, 
his actions are entirely consistent with accession to undue influence. 
  Not surprisingly the Court of Appeal was asked to apply the President’s own 
dicta from Re T to the effect that improper pressure can “subtle, insidious, pervasive 
and where religious beliefs are involved especially powerful”. The Court of Appeal, 
however, refused to overturn the President’s decision. 
 It is submitted that this case represents a missed opportunity to develop the law 
along justifiable lines. We have seen that in a transaction-based context equity has 
been willing to invoke presumptions of undue influence. The justification for 
evidential presumptions is policy based; the presumptions serve to protect vulnerable 
persons by diluting the evidential burden that they face. As Lord Scott of Foscote put 
it in Etridge, when considering so-called class 2A undue influence, “[t]here are some 
relationships, generally of a fiduciary character, where, as a matter of policy, the law 
requires the dominant party to justify the righteousness of the transaction”.25 In the 
context of transactions the relationship between patient and medical advisor is 
accepted to be one falling within class 2A,
26
 where the law will irrebutably presume 
the requisite trust and confidence, and place the burden of proof on the shoulders of 
the medical advisor where the transaction is one that calls for an explanation. 
 It is submitted that U represents an instance of a type of case where the law ought 
to invoke a presumption of improper pressure. Let me first outline the requisite 
features of what I submit should become a new category of presumed undue 
influence. It is argued that undue influence ought to be presumed where the patient 
proves 
 
(a) the relationship between the parties is one of patient and medical advisor; 
(b) the medical advisor has put pressure on the patient to reach a particular decision 
(i.e., the decision reached); and 
(c) the patient needs persuasion for reasons other than an initial failure to understand 
the full details of relevant medical science. 
 
 It should be clear from these criteria that what I have in mind might be called 
directive counselling, i.e., where a medical advisor seeks to press his/her own ethical 
views upon the patient. Moreover, the term “medical advisor” is being used to cover 
those purporting to be have medical expertise and advising/counselling patients on the 
basis of that expertise. Doctors and nurses are paradigmatically medical advisors so 
defined. 
 Criterion (a) defines a relationship that, as a matter of policy, the law recognises to 
be one of trust and confidence in other contexts. This relationship is one where one 
party, the patient, is particularly vulnerable because it is formed where that party 
seeks to rely on the expertise of the other at a time of need, uncertainty, and, often, ill 
health. Criterion (b) and (c) serve to provide greater specification for a modified 
version of the second requirement applying to transactions, namely, the requirement 
that the transaction be one that calls for an explanation. In other words, where (b) and 
(c) exist in the context of (a), the patient’s decision calls for an explanation, so that it 
is appropriate for the medical advisor to bear the burden of showing that undue 
influence has not been applied. 
 I submit that these three criteria are sufficient (but by no means necessary) 
conditions for the imposition of a rebuttable inference of undue influence in the 
context of medical treatment. The justification for this conclusion rests on a number 
of considerations in addition to the need to protect the vulnerable.
27
 First, medical 
advisors are typically subjects of respect and authority and such power should be 
exercised responsibly. Second, medical advisors are not necessarily ethically 
qualified; their position is defined by medical expertise. Third, patients have a right to 
autonomous self-determination. Fourth, where a medical advisor has an ethical or 
religious objection to a legally available treatment or service, it is an abuse of position 
for that medical advisor to use his/her post to impose those views. In the context of 
abortion, for example, the law recognises that it is inappropriate to force doctors who 
object to abortion on ethical grounds to prevent a patient gaining access to abortion 
and doctors are under a legal duty to direct the patient to a doctor without such ethical 
objections.
28
 
 To be clear, I am arguing for a rebuttable evidential inference of undue influence, 
analogous to class 2A undue influence in the context of transactions, where the three 
criteria above are satisfied. Thus, where these three criteria are established, the 
patient’s will should be presumed to be overborne. Moreover, evidential obstacles 
should not be placed in the way of establishing these criteria. Criterion (b), for 
example, could, in appropriate circumstances, be established by the existence of a 
stated ethical policy. 
 If sound, this reasoning would apply with some force to U. Since, on the facts, the 
“evidence was finely balanced”, it is clear that the Centre for Reproductive Medicine 
would not have been able to rebut an evidential inference of undue influence. I would 
go further and argue that this inference should only be capable of being rebutted by 
clear and compelling evidence, such as proof that the patient has been provided with 
independent advice and the details of an appropriate alternative supplier of the 
treatment or service. What is sufficient must vary according to the circumstances. In 
U’s case, for example, the late stage at which the pressure was applied should have 
made rebutting any such inference very difficult indeed. 
 I have not yet explored any competing polices or factors to those that I suggest 
support an inference of undue influence where my three criteria are satisfied. A 
counter argument, applying in specifiable instances, is suggested by the Court of 
Appeal’s decision in U. As stated above, although it is clear that the Court of Appeal 
supported the President’s conclusion it is not clear whether it supported the entirety of 
her analysis on undue influence. In response to an argument by counsel for Mrs U to 
the effect that the President had applied the wrong legal test for (actual) undue 
influence, Hale LJ asserts that this was not the question faced by the court.
29
 She then 
went on to analyse effective consent under the Human Fertilisation and Embryology 
Act 1990 (hereafter HFE Act). It is submitted that it is, therefore, possible to view the 
ratio of the Court of Appeal’s decision as either  
 (a) upholding the President’s analysis of undue influence, but restricting it to effective 
consent under the HFE Act or  
(b) rejecting at least some part of the President’s analysis of undue influence but 
holding that, in the context of the HFE Act, the President’s decision was correct. 
 
 
 Hale LJ distinguished the transaction-based case law on undue influence by, inter 
alia, asserting that in those cases there was some other justification for disapplying 
the questioned decision, whereas “[t]here is no other justification [in the absence of 
effective consent] for continuing to store human sperm”.30 Thus, 
 
a Centre having in their possession a form dealing with the matters with which it is 
required by schedule 3 to the 1990 Act to deal should be both entitled and expected to 
rely upon that form according to its letter, unless and until it can clearly be established 
that the form does not represent a valid decision by the person apparently signing 
it….The equitable concepts of misrepresentation and undue influence may have a part to 
play but the courts should be slow to find them established in such a way as to supply a 
centre with a consent which they would not otherwise have.
31
 
 
According to the Court of Appeal, it follows that the President did not apply too strict 
a test. This might be read as suggesting that the policy of the HFE Act renders it 
inappropriate for a presumption of undue influence to operate. 
 Drawing on the Court of Appeal’s decision, two aspects of the HFE Act might be 
thought to have a bearing on my argument for a presumption of undue influence.  
 First, for posthumous storage and use of gametes the Act requires effective 
(written and not withdrawn) consent to prevent subsequent disputes and provide clear 
evidence that a posthumous child was wanted by both parents. The Court of Appeal 
suggests that the Act’s underlying policy should render the court reluctant to interfere 
with the decision as stated on the face of the relevant documentation.  
 Second, the Act places a significant hurdle in the way of posthumous storage and 
use. The Act requires that account be taken of the welfare of the child who will be 
born or affected as a result, including the need for a father of any child born as a 
result of treatment,
32
 and any child born as a result of posthumous insemination is 
rendered legally fatherless.
33
 This combination means that it is easy for a clinic to find 
that posthumous use is not in the child’s best interests. Indeed, the licensing 
authority’s code of practice asserts that clinics should explicitly consider whether the 
child will have no legal father and pay particular attention to whether the prospective 
mother will be able to meet the child’s needs.34 Perhaps not surprisingly, about a third 
of clinics do not perform posthumous insemination.
35
 
 I submit that these two factors do not undermine my argument for an evidential 
inference of undue influence applying where the abovementioned three criteria apply 
in the context of posthumous storage and use of sperm.  
 The first argument did not prevent another panel of the Court of Appeal ignoring 
the Act’s need for written consent in R v Human Fertilisation and Embryology 
Authority, ex parte Blood [1997].
36
 As is well known, this was a case where sperm 
was removed from a comatose man and stored without his written consent, and his 
bereaved wife sought permission to export the sperm for treatment abroad. 
Admittedly, in the Blood case the Court of Appeal only condoned the (unlawful) 
storage of sperm on the basis that the cases presented an “unexplored legal situation”, 
which the court thought would not occur again.
37
 Nonetheless, ensuring that an 
existing written statement provided in the context of assisted reproductive services is 
truly representative of the deceased’s views is a much more compelling ground for 
judicial intervention than ensuring that the deceased views casually expressed outside 
the context of assisted reproduction are followed. Unlike Mr Blood, Mr U had 
consented in writing to posthumous storage and use as required by the HFE Act, but 
had withdrawn it under pressure. 
 The second argument is relevant to a clinic’s decision on whether to provide 
posthumous insemination but, it is submitted, it should have no impact on who should 
bear the burden of proof with regard to the voluntariness of the deceased’s expressed 
views. Three things need to be distinguished: a clinic’s powers in relation to the 
treatment services it provides, a clinic’s powers in relation to the storage services it 
provides, and a clinics powers in relation to the counselling and advisory services it 
provides. Subject to the requirement that a public body must not fetter its discretion 
by operating an absolute policy,
38
 it is perfectly legitimate for a clinic to refuse 
posthumous insemination in the exercise of its discretion under the HFE Act. Indeed, 
we have seen that under s.13 of the Act it is a condition of a clinic’s treatment 
licences that it withhold treatment services (including the provision of posthumous 
insemination and implantation) where it considers such services not to be in the best 
interests of the child. This condition does not, however, apply to a clinic’s storage 
licences, i.e., the clinic has no such discretion with regard to its storage of gametes 
under s.14 of the Act. Moreover, a clinic has no statutory power to direct its patients 
to accept its ethical views. Thus, what statutory support exists for denying 
posthumous insemination and implantation does not provide any statutory resistance 
to judicial use of evidential inferences of undue influence. 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 The law has long shown deference to the views of the medical profession,
39
 even 
where the matter is inherently ethical rather than purely medical. In cases on the 
appropriate level of disclosure of information by doctors to their patients, for 
example, the courts have held that a medical advisor will not be negligent if s/he 
discloses only those risks that would have been disclosed by a reasonable doctor, 
rather than those risks that a reasonable patient, or a specific patient, would want 
disclosed.
40
 As the courts now appear to be conceding,
41
 this undermines patient 
autonomy by granting the medical profession a discretion extending beyond their 
medical expertise. In a similar light, I have argued in this article that the operation of 
the doctrine of undue influence to medical treatment needs to be reconsidered to avoid 
undue deference to the ethical views of the medical profession and to protect 
vulnerable patients. More specifically, I have argued that vulnerable patients should 
be protected from overbearing ethical advice by an evidential presumption that any 
ethical pressure was sufficient to render the patient’s decision involuntary. 
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